Kármán Gábor: Erdélyi külpolitika a vesztfáliai béke után/ Transylvania’s Foreign Policy following the Peace of Westphalia by Szabó, András Péter
Hungarian Historical Review 2,  no. 4  (2013): 929–964
929http://www.hunghist.org
BOOK REVIEWS
Erdélyi külpolitika a vesztfáliai béke után [Transylvania’s Foreign Policy 
following the Peace of  Westphalia]. By Gábor Kármán. Budapest: 
L’Harmattan, 2011. 484 pp.
The period following the Peace of  Westphalia was an era of  exciting and 
far-reaching structural change in the history of  Europe. In this book Gábor 
Kármán, a prominent scholar of  the history of  the Transylvanian Principality 
and the diplomatic history of  the early modern period, guides his reader through 
the fi rst ten years following the conclusion of  the treaties in 1648, a decade rich 
with decisive events. He examines the shift that took place in foreign policy over 
time as denominational elements gradually came to play a smaller and smaller 
role in the decisions of  policy makers, not to mention the justifi cations given 
for these decisions, yielding gradually to simple reason of  state, which used old 
sectarian arguments at most as a tool in order to mask other goals. For readers 
unfamiliar with the subject it may seem a bit odd that Kármán seeks to illustrate 
this process with the example of  the Transylvanian Principality, which was one 
of  the vassal states of  the Ottoman Empire, but in the seventeenth century, 
its limited sovereignty notwithstanding, this successor state of  the medieval 
Hungarian Kingdom, under the leadership of  Calvinist rulers, sometimes 
pursued a remarkably independent foreign policy and appeared as an important 
actor on the stage of  European politics.
The book essentially offers an overview of  the foreign policy of  
Transylvanian Prince György Rákóczi II (1648–1660) up until his entry in 
the Second Northern War (the military campaign launched in 1657 in alliance 
with Sweden against King John II Casimir of  Poland), which had disastrous 
consequences for Transylvania. However, since Kármán is most interested in the 
structural changes that took place, he also includes at the beginning of  the book 
a brief  overview of  the campaign (1644–1645) led by the Prince’s father, György 
Rákóczi I, against Ferdinand III, as well as the justifi cation that was given for 
this campaign. He considers the role that the Transylvanian Principality played in 
the last stages of  the Thirty Years’ War among the Protestant countries and the 
place it was given in the Westphalia system. In the course of  his analysis Gábor 
Kármán makes use of  excellent source materials, including a number of  historical 
syntheses published in Western Europe, publications of  annotated sources by 
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nineteenth-century historian Sándor Szilágyi, and works by Ágnes R. Várkonyi, 
Katalin Péter and Sándor Gebei, twentieth-century historians from the postwar 
period. In 2010 a collection of  essays on the period of  György Rákóczi II’s rule 
was published1 (as it so happens a collection that Kármán and I edited together) 
that provided a fi rm foundation for further study of  many important questions 
regarding the period. Kármán’s book, however, differs from other studies of  
the era in Hungary in that he contextualizes his assessment of  the events in a 
broader theoretical framework and scrutinizes the motivations and justifi cations 
behind the various foreign policy maneuvers with considerable skepticism. 
The theoretical framework of  Kármán’s inquiry is comprised of  three 
paradigms: Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard’s theory of  confessionalization, 
which links the formation of  denominations to the emergence of  the modern 
territorial state, structural political history, which offers a new approach to the 
narration of  political confl icts, and fi nally discourse theory, which provides new 
methods in the analysis of  communication. Of  these three pillars, the book 
rests perhaps most fi rmly on the second, structural political history, which is 
hardly surprising since the focus of  Kármán’s study is foreign policy. One of  the 
virtues of  the book is that Kármán only refers to the theoretical underpinnings 
when actually necessary. Moreover, he does not treat the theories as axioms, but 
rather as heuristic tools. He therefore offers not simply an array of  examples, 
but an engaging and highly readable analysis which always strives to shed light 
on the actual motives that lay behind the offi cial explanations of  foreign policy 
decisions.
The main chapters of  the book are arranged in chronological order. They 
address individual nodes of  Transylvanian foreign policy. These attentive 
case studies are followed by a conclusion in which Kármán summarizes the 
transformation that took place in the strategies that were used to win legitimacy. 
The point of  departure is the campaign launched in early 1644 by György 
Rákóczi I, in alliance with France and Sweden, against Ferdinand III, one of  
the confl icts of  the Thirty Years’ War that has been characterized with stubborn 
persistence in the secondary literature as a continuation of  the earlier, similar 
military campaigns of  Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629). (It is worth noting that 
this interpretation is not merely the work of  later historians, rather it is implied 
by the rhetoric of  the proclamation issued by Rákóczi, in which he alludes to 
1  Szerencsének elegyes forgása. II. Rákóczi György és kora [Mixed Turns of  Fate. Rákóczi György II and His 
Era], ed. Gábor Kármán and András Péter Szabó (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2009).
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Bethlen.) The two enemies in the confl ict, György Rákóczi I and Palatine Miklós 
Esterházy (the representative of  the royal Estates), had their proclamations 
published in printed form. Since there were no regularly appearing organs of  
the press in Hungary in the seventeenth century, Kármán consulted personal 
correspondence. He makes no mention of  the circular letters (which had the 
tone of  manifestos) written by the Prince, the Palatine, and other offi cials as a 
separate kind of  source, but he makes use of  them in his inquiry as well. The 
Transylvanian Prince presented himself  as the defender of  the royal Estates in a 
manner that had been customary since the uprising led by István Bocskai in 1606, 
but Kármán persuasively demonstrates that Rákóczi quite deliberately placed less 
emphasis on denominational considerations in his justifi cation of  the campaign 
than his predecessors had, and he presents these considerations more as affronts 
to the Estates. In contrast, the Palatine’s characterization of  the confl ict implied 
that the Prince represented not the Estates, but only Protestant interests, and 
he consistently added that Rákóczi was motivated by little more than personal 
avarice.2 Esterházy was not entirely wrong, for alongside the concerns of  the 
Protestant denominations and the Estates, often condemned self-interest also 
played a role in the launch of  the campaign. In the end it was seen as a sectarian 
enterprise, the Prince’s intentions notwithstanding. As he clarifi es this point, 
Kármán also persuasively refutes two widespread but (at least in my assessment) 
mistaken views. First, he notes that Transylvania cannot be considered to have 
been a denominationally neutral state in the seventeenth century. The frequently 
alleged notion of  the multi-confessional nature of  the Principality is undermined 
by the power position of  the Calvinist Church over the other denominations 
(fi rst and foremost the Unitarians and the Catholics). Thus Transylvania should 
be regarded more as a distinctive example of  unfi nished confessionalization. 
Second, Kármán alludes briefl y to the fact that the campaign led by Rákóczi 
2  It is worth noting one detail not mentioned in the book. On November 6, 1644 at one of  the sittings 
of  the peace negotiations in Nagyszombat (today Trnava in Slovakia) the emissary of  Bártfa (today 
Bardejov in Slovakia), who was a supporter of  Rákóczi, thus recounted Miklós Esterházy’s words: “Nu, 
vos domini conjicitis culpam huius mali in nos, cum tamen vos estis autores, vos praetenditis speciosum 
titulum religionis et libertatis, sed falsa sunt, ut etiam Betlehemus fecit, ad quae haec tria potissimum ipsum 
appulerant: 1. Cupido habendi. 2. Libido dominandi. 3. Ambitio ulciscendi. Ita et vester princeps non aliis 
rationibus motus, quam his, et pretiosum vel speciosum titulum, et hac ratione vult vos subjugare, immo 
jam colla vestra subjugavit, privabit vos libertatibus, devastabit regnum. – et alia plurima incompetentia 
dixit.” Štátny archív v Prešove, pobočka Bardejov, Archív mesta Bardejova, Mestské kníhy, Nr. 690, Acta 
diaetalia 1644–1655. f. 47r. 
HHR_2013_4.indb   931 2013.12.10.   13:49:16
932
Hungarian Historical Review 2,  no. 4  (2013): 929–964
should not be linked to the idea of  the “national kingdom,” a somewhat vague 
notion that was given too much weight in postwar Hungarian historiography.
In the subsequent chapter Kármán examines the place occupied by the 
Transylvanian Principality in the hierarchical international system before the 
Peace of  Westphalia, and his examination rests not on representations of  power, 
but on concrete political acts and the reactions of  the great powers. Basing his 
depiction on the negotiations that took place in 1644–1645 between Transylvania 
and Sweden and Transylvania and France, the reception of  the separate peace 
concluded by the Prince in Linz in 1645, and the trifl ing role of  Transylvania at 
the Westphalia peace negotiations, Kármán offers a very disillusioning portrayal 
of  the prestige of  the Principality, if  nonetheless more precise than any portrait 
so far. The Protestant powers reckoned with Transylvania, but they hardly 
considered it an ally or partner of  equal rank. As a vassal state of  the Ottoman 
Empire, Transylvania was regularly regarded with palpable suspicion, and this 
became something of  a self-fulfi lling prophecy when it came to decisions such 
as Rákóczi’s arbitrary withdrawal from the war. In the end neither Transylvania 
nor the Protestant powers of  Europe showed much mutual trust. Transylvania 
did not even send an emissary to the Westphalia negotiations, though the 
Principality did manage to obtain the modest achievement of  being included in 
the Treaty of  Osnabrück as one of  the allies of  Sweden (and at the same time 
of  the emperor!). 
The question of  relations with Poland was an issue in 1648, when György 
Rákóczi II succeeded his father, and it remained an issue throughout his rule. 
Infl uenced by the (admittedly somewhat distant) example set by Transylvanian 
Prince István Báthory (1571–1586), the Rákóczi house also sought to obtain 
the Polish royal title. They had perhaps the best chance of  doing so in the fall 
of  1648, immediately before the death of  the elder György Rákóczi, when the 
Polish elite suddenly found itself  in need of  military assistance because of  a 
Cossack attack. However, the fact that no one was even named indicates the 
haphazard nature of  the plans. The Transylvanian emissaries sometimes strove 
to win support for the older Prince and sometimes endeavored to curry favor 
for his younger son, Zsigmond Rákóczi (1622–1652). (The book has perhaps 
only one structural fl aw, namely that this fact is only mentioned in the middle 
of  the chapter.) The supporters of  the Rákóczi house in Poland, however, were 
almost exclusively either Protestants or Orthodox, and the possible support of  
the Cossacks, who were also Orthodox, meant more of  a disadvantage than 
an advantage in Polish politics. Furthermore, the efforts of  the Transylvanian 
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Principality did not have the support of  the European Protestant Powers. 
György Rákóczi II used the Polish–Cossack war to continue his father’s efforts 
up until the summer of  1651, though with decreasing chances of  success. In 
1653 Transylvanian–Polish relations warmed as a consequence of  the Cossacks’ 
armed intervention in Moldova, but this proved only transitional. 
György Rákóczi II was able to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy 
in part because at the beginning of  his rule he managed to secure his position 
with regards to the Ottoman Empire (which was gradually weakening) and 
Ferdinand III. He came into confl ict with the Turks over a threatened (and in the 
end accepted) rise in taxes and with the Habsburgs over the offi cial expulsion 
of  the Jesuits from Transylvania in 1652. The Viennese court also regarded the 
marriage of  the Prince’s younger brother Zsigmond Rákóczi to Henrietta Maria 
von der Pfalz (the daughter of  Frederick V of  Pfalz, who for a short time had 
been King of  Bohemia) in 1651 as a hostile move, though Kármán persuasively 
argues that the alliance was not based on any concrete political plan, but rather 
simply on considerations of  prestige.
The two chapters on the complex relationship between the Transylvanian 
Principality and the aristocracy of  the Hungarian Kingdom (which at this time 
for the most part was Catholic) are particularly interesting. Building on the work 
of  Katalin Péter and making small changes to her model, Kármán examines 
the process whereby, following the ratifi cation of  the Peace Treaty of  Linz 
at the 1646–1647 National Assembly (in other words the relatively enduring 
resolution of  debates between the denominations), the traditional coalitions in 
domestic politics, which were essentially divided on the basis of  denominational 
differences, fell apart and a relationship based on mutually benefi cial cooperation 
developed between the Catholic Palatine Pál Pálffy and the Calvinist Prince 
György Rákóczi II. Kármán considers the role of  the Prince’s brother Zsigmond 
(who resided in the Hungarian Kingdom) to have been signifi cant only in the 
maintenance of  relationships in the early 1650s, and he contradicts the widely 
familiar view of  Ágnes R. Várkonyi with his assertion that there is no trace in 
the politics of  the younger György Rákóczi of  any thought of  going to war 
with the Ottoman Empire until the crisis of  power in Transylvania after 1657. 
At the same time this would have meant that the two sides, having set aside 
denominational differences, must have profoundly misunderstood each other, 
since the elite of  the Hungarian Kingdom had always sought to expel the Turks 
from the region. (The presence of  anti-Turk nobiliary nationalism in the letters 
of  György Rákóczi II does seem to suggest that he entertained the idea of  a 
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struggle against the Turks before 1657.) With the death of  Pál Pálffy in 1653 the 
relationship between the Principality and the Hungarian Kingdom weakened, 
and in the subsequent political life of  the Kingdom, which was dominated 
by Archbishop of  Esztergom György Lippay and was rife with personal and 
rekindled denominational strife, the Transylvanian Prince could only count on 
individual members of  the aristocracy, such as Miklós Zrínyi (also a famous 
poet) or Ferenc Nádasdy. (His close relationship with Ádám Batthyány did not 
begin then, as Kármán suggests, but rather in the early 1650s.)
The need arose in connection with the plans regarding Poland in the early 
1650s for the Principality to develop a more detailed and denominationally neutral 
strategy of  legitimation in order to justify any aggressive steps, and Kármán 
discerns a similar effort in connection with the 1653 Moldovan crisis. When 
György Rákóczi II removed Vasile Lupu, the inimical Voivode of  Moldova, after 
launching a military campaign in 1653 he characterized his actions as a preventive 
measure.3 As a consequence of  the 1653 military campaign in Moldova and the 
1655 campaign in Wallachia, the Romanian Voivodships, which were also among 
the vassals of  the Ottoman Empire but which were in a considerably weaker 
position, became subordinate to the Transylvanian Principality.
In 1655, following Sweden’s attack on the Polish Kingdom, György Rákóczi 
II, having gained greater scope for action and increased self-assurance, revived 
his plans for the Polish lands, and in 1657, in an alliance with Sweden and the 
Cossacks, he attacked the Rzeczpospolita Polska. Kármán disputes the view of  
Sándor Gebei and makes a persuasive case in support of  the following points: 
1) the Prince initiated the relationship with Sweden, 2) in the period of  rapid 
advance, the Swedes did not intent to divide the  Rzeczpospolita, and 3) in the 
course of  negotiations with the Transylvanian Prince Swedish King Charles 
Gustave X conducted himself  in good faith. Indeed it was György Rákóczi 
II who did not ratify the Radnót treaty and throughout the military campaign 
against Poland he continuously maintained ties with the Poles.4
3  Kármán presents the justifi cation given for the war on the basis of  a letter that the Prince wrote to 
the Polish King John II Casimir, though one fi nds other signs of  the legitimation strategy in Transylvanian 
sources as well, such as in the unpublished chronicle of  the notary of  Beszterce (today Bistriţa in Romania): 
“Ob supra memoratas procul dubio nefandas practicas per Basilium Moldaviae despotam ac vaivodam in 
Porta Othomanica motas, quamobrem jure merito insurrectio publica contra eundem facta est.” Serviciul 
Judeţean al Arhivelor Naţionale Cluj-Napoca. Primăria oraşului Bistriţa, a. III, p. 3, 329.
4  Kármán recently published an engaging article on the diplomat steps taken during the Polish campaign 
of  György Rákóczi II. Kármán Gábor, “II. Rákóczi György 1657. évi lengyelországi hadjáratának 
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In the last chapters of  the book Kármán offers a kind of  summary 
characterization of  the foreign policy of  György Rákóczi II and the role of  
denominational considerations in foreign policy decisions. First he refutes 
the misconception, prevalent in Swedish historiography, according to which 
György Rákóczi II was a religious fanatic. Although Comenius and his circle 
did everything they could to pull the Transylvanian Prince into their political 
plans, György Rákóczi II himself  showed little interest. While he may have taken 
advantage, from time to time, of  the Moravian fugitive scholar’s vast network of  
connections, he did not share his views, and the Polish military campaign was 
not prompted by Comenius’ ideas. Kármán provides a detailed explanation as 
to why he doesn’t accept earlier hypotheses of  Hungarian historians regarding 
the reasons for the campaign and then presents the Prince’s offi cial justifi cation. 
In his manifesto, Rákóczi emphasizes the earlier offer of  the Polish throne, 
Christian mercy, and the restoration of  the rights (fi rst and foremost freedom of  
conscience) that had been violated in the course of  the fi ghting. He also makes 
strong appeals, stronger than in his earlier proclamations, to the concept of  
the just war (bellum iustum). Finally, Kármán endeavors to answer the question 
regarding the true reason for the military campaign. In his view, it lies primarily 
in dynastic considerations. Through his conquests (which were presented as 
peaceful occupations), György Rákóczi II sought to strengthen his family’s 
reputation and power. If  one fi nds credible the detailed account of  György 
Horváth-Kissevith, an emissary of  the Hungarian Kingdom who sought an 
audience with the Prince before the military campaign was launched, Rákóczi 
himself  alluded to this motive in confi dential conversations.5
In his conclusion, Kármán again traces the shift from a foreign policy that 
was based on denominational interests (or at least derived its legitimacy from 
denominational considerations) to the autocracy of  the reason of  state, which 
diplomáciai háttere” [The Diplomatical Background of  the 1657 Military Campaign in Poland of  György 
Rákóczi II], Századok 146, no. 5 (2012): 1049–84. 
5  György Horváth-Kissevith’s report to the King on his visit to the Transylvanian Prince in early 
December. At the end of  the last meeting the emissary, at the suggestion of  chancellor György Szelepcsényi, 
praised Transylvania and Rákóczi, who had conquered Wallachia and Moldova and even had control over 
part of  Hungary and therefore could be quite satisfi ed with his attainments: “Respondit princeps: eam esse 
naturam principum et quorumvis aliorum, ut modum, quo familiam suam ad altiora evehere, et dignitatibus 
maximis ampliare et condecorare possint, studeant adinvenire, sic et se dictus princeps, si – ita inquit – Deo 
visum foret, eiusmodi occasionibus merito parere posse.” Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, 
A 98, Magyar Kancellária, gyűjteményes fondok – Transylvanica, b. 12, f. 16 (1650–1658), no. 47 (cs. 13, f. 
1117.) Kármán makes use of  the source in his discussion of  the standpoint of  Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, but 
does not refer to it with regards to this.
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served both the interests of  the ruler and the welfare of  the public and was 
always able to incorporate other kinds of  reasoning. In his view Rákóczi’s Polish 
military campaign might well have served both his own personal interests and 
the interests of  the Transylvanian state, but given the Prince’s failure to prevail it 
is assessed as a blunder from the perspective of  reason of  state.
One should make some mention of  the book’s fl aws, as well as the 
underlying concept. It contains an almost trivial number of  factual errors. Ever 
since the publication of  János Heltai’s monograph on the subject few historians 
would claim that the Querela Hungaria was compiled by Alvinczi Péter (p.46),6 
the 1645 Colloquium Charitativum (referred to in the book as the Collegium 
charitativum) was not the initiative of  Comenius, but rather King Ladislaus IV 
of  Poland (p.121),7 and the wife of  Palatine Ferenc Wesselényi, who visited 
Zsuzsanna Lorántffy in 1655, was not Zsófi a Bosnyák but Mária Széchy (p.289). 
But these are essentially the only mistakes. Kármán’s analysis of  the foreign policy 
of  the Transylvania Principality is a work of  unparalleled cogency and precision. 
However, one may nonetheless entertain doubts concerning the thesis of  the 
work, according to which denominational concerns were gradually relegated to 
the background. The comparison drawn between the legitimation of  György 
Rákóczi I’s military campaign against the Hungarian Kingdom in 1644–1645 and 
the theoretical justifi cations given for the Transylvanian foreign policy of  the 
1650s is misleadingly simple. Given the strong mental and material connections 
between the two countries and György Rákóczi I’s expansive estates in Hungary, 
the fi rst cannot really be considered simply as a foreign policy decision. Its 
legitimation reminds us far more of  the propaganda of  a civil war, and the 
Prince’s attempt to disguise his denominationally motivated statements as non-
denominational is suspicious at best. György Rákóczi II’s military campaigns 
of  the 1650s had no real “antecedent,” since no Transylvanian prince had ever 
interfered so directly in the affairs of  a neighboring state, with the exception 
of  the Hungarian Kingdom, which was regarded as part of  the Hungarian 
“homeland.” (Had György Rákóczi I actually helped Wallachia in the confl ict 
with Moldova in the 1630s, there might be some comparison.) In 1653 György 
Rákóczi II could hardly cite the defense of  Protestantism as an explanation for 
6  János Heltai, Alvinczi Péter és a heidelbergi peregrinusok [Péter Alvinczi and the Heidelberg Pilgrims] 
(Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 1994), 129–54.
7  Milada Blekestad, Comenius. Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský 
(Oslo–Prague: Universitetsforlaget–Academia, 1969), 398–407.
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the campaign against Moldova. Drawing distinctions between various strategies 
of  legitimation is also problematic. In the case of  confl icts for which we have 
plentiful sources it is clear that the Prince used a variety of  different kinds of  
justifi cations, depending on the audience. (Kármán emphasizes this in connection 
with the campaign of  1644–1645.) However, there is a dearth of  sources on the 
legitimation strategies used in the 1650s, and we have only a small slice of  the 
communications on which to base tentative conclusions.
Whatever we may think of  the shift towards reason of  state (depicted on 
the cover of  the book with a two-headed fi gure), Gábor Kármán’s eloquently 
written, clearly structured book is a milestone in the study of  Transylvanian 
foreign policy and more broadly Hungarian politics of  the early Modern Era. 
It offers new methodological approaches and corrects many misunderstandings 
found in earlier secondary literature. In its theoretical sophistication, its use of  
sources, and the equipoise of  its analyses it sets an admirably high standard. 
Translated by Thomas Cooper
András Péter Szabó
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